Legacy Of the Clinton Bubble by Canova, Timothy
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
Law Faculty News Articles, Editorials, and Blogs Fowler School of Law
1-1-2008
Legacy Of the Clinton Bubble
Timothy Canova
Chapman University, Fowler School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/law_news_articles
Part of the Economic History Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Faculty News Articles, Editorials, and Blogs by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Canova, Timothy A. "Legacy of the Clinton bubble." Dissent 55.3 (2008): 41-50.
Legacy Of the Clinton Bubble
Comments
This article was originally published in Dissent, volume 55, issue 3, in 2008.
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of scholarly citation, none of this work may
be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher. For information
address the University of Pennsylvania Press, 3905 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112.
Copyright
University of Pennsylvania Press
This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/law_news_articles/109
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
Law Faculty Articles and Research Fowler School of Law
2008
Legacy Of the Clinton Bubble
Timothy Canova
Chapman University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/law_articles
Part of the Economic History Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Canova, Timothy A. "Legacy of the Clinton bubble." Dissent 55.3 (2008): 41-50.
Legacy of the Clinton Bubble
Timothy A. Canova
T HE CONVENTIONAL wisdom has heldthat economic policy was a greatsuccess under Bill Clinton in the
1990s and a failure ever since. Hillary Clinton
has made the comparison often, promising to
end "the seven year detour" and "attack pov-
erty by making the economy work again." In
January, in response to the president's State of
the Union Address, Barack Obama stated that
it was "George Bush's Washington that let the
banks and financial institutions run amok and
take our economy down this dangerous road."
Perhaps this reading of history makes for
good politics in an election year, and it is cer-
tainly better for the Clintons than for anyone
else. The only problem is that the story line is
flawed. One could even say that it's a bit of a
fairy tale.
For six of eight years, Bill Clinton governed
with Republican majorities in Congress. Not
surprisingly, there was much continuity be-
tween the Clinton and Bush administrations.
Both embraced the so-called Washington Con-
sensus, a policy agenda of fiscal austerity, cen-
tral-bank autonomy, deregulated markets,
liberalized capital flows, free trade, and
privatization.
On each of these crucial issues, the most
significant differences between Clinton and
Bush were differences in timing and degree,
not in direction. Both administrations were
willfully asleep at the wheel. Clinton was for-
tunate to preside over the early stages of a
bubble economy. Bush has had the misfortune
of presiding as a lame duck through the final
stages of the same bubble and, thanks to the
deregulation of the Clinton years, without a
regulatory structure capable of containing
today's speculative fevers.
In 1992, Bill Clinton campaigned on the
promise of a short-term stimulus package. But
soon after being elected, he met privately with
Alan Greenspan, chair of the Federal Reserve
Board, and soon accepted what became known
as "the financial markets strategy." It was a
strategy of placating financial markets. The
stimulus package was sacrificed, taxes were
raised, spending was cut—all in a futile effort
to keep long-term interest rates from rising, and
all of which helped the Democrats lose their
majority in the House. In fact, the defeat of
the stimulus package set off a sharp decline in
Clinton's public approval ratings from which
his presidency would never recover.
It is easy to forget that Clinton had other
alternatives. In 1993, Democrats in Congress
were attempting to rein in the Federal Reserve
by making it more accountable and transpar-
ent. Those efforts were led by the chair of the
House Banking Committee, the late Henry B.
Gonzalez, who warned that the Fed was creat-
ing a giant casino economy, a house of cards, a
"monstrous bubble." But such calls for regula-
tion and transparency fell on deaf ears in the
Clinton White House and Treasury.
The pattern was set early. The Federal Re-
serve became increasingly independent of
elected branches and more captive of private
financial interests. This was seen as "sound
economics" and necessary to keep inflation low.
Yet the Federal Reserve's autonomy left it a cap-
tive of a financial constituency it could no
longer control or regulate. Instead, the Fed
would rely on one very blunt policy instrument,
its authority to set short-term interest rates. As
a result of such an active monetary policy, the
nation's fiscal policy was constrained, public
investment declined, critical infrastructure
needs were ignored. Moreover, the Fed's stop-
and-go interest-rate policy encouraged the
growth of a bubble economy in housing, credit,
and currency markets.
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November 12, 1999: Bill Clinton signs the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernizaton Act, which repealed parts of the
1933 Glass-Steagall Act and and opened the floodgates for deregulation. Alan Greenspan and congressional leaders applaud.
Perhaps the biggest of these bubbles was
the inflated U.S. dollar, one of several troubling
consequences of the Clinton administration's
free-trade policies. Although Clinton spoke
from the left on trade issues, he governed from
the right and ignored the need for any mini-
mum floor on labor, human rights, or environ-
mental standards in trade agreements. After
pushing the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) through Congress on the
strength of Republican votes, Clinton paved
the way for China's entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) only a few years after
China's bloody crackdown on pro-democracy
demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in Beijing.
During Clinton's eight years in office, the
U.S. current account deficit, the broadest mea-
sure of trade competitiveness, increased fivefold,
from $84 billion to $415 billion. The trade defi-
cit increased most dramatically at the end of the
Clinton years. In 1999, the U.S. merchandise
trade deficit surpassed $338 billion, a 53 per-
cent increase from $220 billion in 1998.
In early March 2000, Greenspan warned that
the current account deficit could only be fi-
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nanced by "ever-larger portfolio and direct for-
eign investments in the United States, an out-
come that cannot continue without limit." The
needed capital inflows did continue for nearly
eight Bush years. But it was inevitable that the
inflows would not be sustained and the dollar
would drop. Perhaps the singular success of Bill
Clinton was to hand the hot potato to another
president before the asset price bubble went bust.
Financial Deregulation under Clinton
No one could drive a car well for very long on
roads without traffic lights, stop signs, or speed
limits. There is an obvious need for sensible
regulation, even "command and control" regu-
lation, to facilitate safety and traffic flow. Like-
wise with most markets, particularly the
financial markets, where some degree of regu-
lation is necessary to prevent fraud and pro-
vide order, stability, and coherence to private
transactions. Yet the Washington Consensus
has denied the need for regulation of the fi-
nancial marketplace at every level. Jagdish
Bhagwati, a prominent free-trade economist,
has referred to the "Wall Street-Treasury-IMF
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complex" to suggest a policy agenda formulated
and pushed by powerful financial interests.
Joseph Stiglitz, the 2001 Nobel laureate in eco-
nomics, has noted the agenda's many unsci-
entific assumptions and refers to its promoters
as "free market fundamentalists."
At the very local level of finance—con-
sumer credit and housing loans—the analogue
to speed limits and traffic-flow regulation
would be limits on loan volumes, interest rates,
and minimum down payments. For years the
federal government had regulated such lend-
ing standards to prevent inflation of asset prices
in key sectors of the economy, particularly dur-
ing wartime and boom times. For instance,
Federal Reserve Regulation X required mini-
mum down payments and maximum periods
of repayment for housing loans. Federal Re-
serve Regulation W utilized the same devices
for consumer credit for the purchase of auto-
mobiles, appliances, and other durable goods.
But starting with the administrations of
Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, and continu-
ing under Clinton, such regulations were mostly
repealed. Known as "selective credit controls,"
these policy instruments took a "command and
control" approach to regulation. It was an ap-
proach that reduced systematic risk by discour-
aging the development of a subprime mortgage
market for borrowers with bad credit. Without
such controls, lenders started making a flood of
loans without minimum down-payment require-
ments, and eventually without even requiring
documentation of income on many loans. Ad-
justable interest rates and hidden balloon pay-
ments made these loans inherently more risky.
Predatory lending was not an invention of
the Bush administration. High-interest payday
loans and subprime mortgages took off under
Clinton. The morals of the marketplace were
once again, "Buyer beware." Many loans,
tellingly referred to as "teaser loans," were
structured so that the monthly mortgage pay-
ments would start off low and rise significantly
in the future, even while the overall loan
amount—the outstanding principal—would
also rise. The borrower would end up worse
off several years into the mortgage than when
the loan began.
But none of this was considered overly
problematic by the Clinton White House.
There was simply too much money to be made
by lenders, brokers, bankers, bond insurers,
ratings agencies, engineers of securitized as-
sets, and managers of special investment ve-
hicles and hedge funds. There was also too
much to be gained by elected officials and
regulators looking the other way.
By 1995, the subprime loan market had
reached $90 billion in loan volume, and it then
doubled over the next three years. Rising loan
volume led to a significant deterioration in loan
quality. Meanwhile, by March 1998, the num-
ber of subprime lenders grew from a small
handful to more than fifty. Ten of the twenty-
five largest subprime lenders were affiliated
with federally chartered bank holding compa-
nies, but federal bank regulators remained un-
concerned.
In 2000, Edward Gramlich, a Federal Re-
serve governor, proposed to Greenspan that the
Fed use its discretionary authority to send bank
examiners to the offices of such lenders. But
Greenspan was opposed and Gramlich never
brought his concerns to the full Federal Re-
serve Board.
G REENSPAN'S laissez-faire philosophy alsoencouraged greater concentration inbanking and the proliferation of com-
plex financial instruments known as deriva-
tives. As early as 1997, there were concerns
about the growth of collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs), derivatives that pooled together
millions of subprime mortgages and divided
their income streams in complex ways. Rather
than reducing risk, the process of securitization
served to increase risk throughout the finan-
cial system. The CDO and other such deriva-
tives were like rocket fuel, transforming the
local greed of subprime lending into a prob-
lem of global proportions. Since the recent
meltdown in the subprime market, investors
have been in a panic to find out which banks
and hedge funds are holding CDOs and other
exotic mortgage-backed securities that are de-
flating in value.
As with the housing bubble, so went the
stock market bubble. The Federal Reserve has
a long history of imposing margin requirements
(minimum down payments) on lending for the
purchase of securities on major exchanges.
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Regulations G, T, and U gave the Fed impor-
tant tools in containing stock-market specula-
tion. But with Clinton in the White House and
Robert Rubin as his treasury secretary,
Greenspan felt no pressure to raise margin re-
quirements even as the stock market bubble
reached new heights. Instead, Clinton reap-
pointed Greenspan as Federal Reserve chair
in early 2000, about six months before
Greenspan's term was due to expire, and ap-
parently without first discussing margin re-
quirements or any other Federal Reserve policy
with Greenspan.
By Clinton's final year in office, the price-
earnings ratio on technology stocks reached
historic peaks and the level of margin debt bor-
rowed from New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
member firms had risen to the highest percent
of market value in twenty-five years. The last
time the country had purchased so much stock
on borrowed money was September 1987, one
month before the Dow Jones Industrial Aver-
age fell 23 percent in one day.
In March 2000, alarmed by the growing
stock market bubble, Richard Grasso, chair of
the NYSE, and Frank Zarb, chair of NASDAQ,
issued an unusual joint statement urging mem-
ber brokerage firms to review the amount of
credit they were extending to investors and to
consider voluntarily raising their margin re-
quirements. The warning fell on deaf ears. In
such a bull market, investors were feeling more
greed than fear, and therefore underestimat-
ing the downside risks in the market.
Meanwhile, Greenspan refused to exercise
any authority and failed to raise margin require-
ments. Instead, he attempted to talk down the
market in his widely reported "irrational exu-
berance" speech. But when the market slid, it
was Greenspan who backed down and provided
verbal reassurances.
Selective credit controls are like a steering
wheel. Margin requirements can steer credit
away from speculative and overheated sectors
of the economy. When the central bank uses
only one blunt policy instrument, the short-term
interest rate, it is abandoning the steering wheel
for the stop-and-go of an accelerator. As the Fed
lowered short-term interest rates, the bubble
expanded and asset prices diverged even further
from economic fundamentals. When the Fed
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later raised interest rates to slow the stock mar-
ket bubble, it ran the risk of puncturing the
bubble completely. This is what Greenspan
faced while the Fed raised short-term interest
rates six times, from 4.75 percent to 6.50 per-
cent, between June 1999 and May 2000. But
with each rise in rates, the bubble only ex-
panded—that is, until the dot-com bubble burst
in the spring of 2000, a bust that did not help
Al Gore's presidential prospects.
This dilemma was not without historical pre-
cedent. Frederick Lewis Allen described a simi-
lar tension between monetary policy and market
psychology in his review of the 1929 stock mar-
ket crash in Only Yesterday. Then, too, the Fed-
eral Reserve "waited patiently for the speculative
fever to cure itself and it had only become more
violent." According to Allen, things had come
to such a pass that if the Fed raised interest rates
still further, it "ran the risk of bringing about a
terrific smash in the market."
In the past, selective credit controls pro-
vided a way around this Catch-22. Margin re-
quirements on security loans, housing loans,
and consumer credit provided the federal gov-
ernment with the policy tools to prevent infla-
tion in particular asset markets. Deregulation
left the Federal Reserve with only one policy
instrument. As the Fed lowered interest rates
to stimulate the real economy, the bubble in
asset prices expanded. When the Fed later
raised interest rates, it posed a mortal danger
to every bubble, including those in housing,
credit, and currency markets.
Deregulation and lax lending practices were
part and parcel of the bubble economy. Clinton
often boasted of the rise in homeownership
during his presidency, foreshadowing the Bush-
Cheney "ownership society." But for too many,
homeownership became something more
speculative, a wager that interest rates would
not rise in the future, and that if rates did rise,
mortgage lenders would allow them to refi-
nance at fixed interest rates based on con-
stantly rising housing prices.
Risk-Based Deregulation
During the Clinton years, command-and-con-
trol regulation was largely replaced by a risk-
based approach that was based on inherently
flawed estimates of value and risk. According
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to risk-based capital requirements, the greater
the risk of a loan, the greater amount of capi-
tal a bank would be required to raise. But this
risk-based approach made little sense when
regulators were using inflated market prices to
build their defenses.
Some commentators have concluded that
market-price-based, risk-sensitive models are
upside down. Booms are fueled by market es-
timates that wrongly undervalue risks, thereby
encouraging imprudent lending. As the boom
matures, everyone undervalues risk, and lend-
ers respond by chasing after the marginal bor-
rower. Regulators fail to pull the banks back.
Instead, they send the wrong message that risks
are falling and capital is sufficient for more
risk-taking.
Some banking and finance experts have pro-
posed making bank capital requirements con-
tra-cyclical by relating the capital adequacy
requirements to the rate of change of bank lend-
ing and asset prices in relevant sectors, such as
the rise in mortgage lending and housing prices.
This, they claim, would build up capital reserves
and restrain bank lending during asset price
booms while encouraging bank lending during
asset price deflations. A final benefit of this ap-
proach would be "to reduce pressure from the
financial system for central banks to adjust mon-
etary policy in the heat of the moment"—or, in
other words, to reduce the need for the Fed to
step on the accelerator in a crisis.
According to Charles Freeland, former
deputy secretary general of the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision, there are problems
with making capital requirements contra-cycli-
cal because "the cyclical indicators would need
to be derived from national markets and it is
difficult to see how they could be applicable
to a bank operating in a highly competitive glo-
bal environment." Moreover, how does one de-
termine the proper cyclical indicator for a
particular security held by a financial institu-
tion? If tranches of a CDO include parts of
mortgage loans pooled from widely varied geo-
graphic locations, some from markets where
housing is in a boom, others where housing is
relatively weaker, it would be impractical to link
the required capital reserve to housing prices.
The esoteric debate about capital adequacy
requirements only reinforces the simple truth
that mortgages and other loans should not be
made in the first place to borrowers with lim-
ited resources. Although some legal scholars
have suggested "suitability" claims against in-
vestment banks for selling risky CDOs, these
problems began upstream. Underlying mort-
gage loans with escalating interest rates and
balloon payments seem inherently unsuitable
when made to borrowers lacking collateral.
There is really no risk-based substitute for
the traffic lights and speed limits and other
safety standards that keep some cars off the
road. At the end of the day, regulators must
regulate. Minimum down-payment require-
ments will keep most of the riskier borrowers
off the road. Moreover, with selective credit
controls, when bank lending and housing
prices escalate too much too quickly in par-
ticular regions, bank supervisors could simply
clamp down by raising the minimum down
payment requirements and restricting the use
of adjustable interest rates and balloon pay-
ments. Such regulation would mean fewer
mortgage loans for marginal borrowers, but it
would also reduce the systematic risks facing
the financial system.
Free-market fundamentalists will argue
that such command-and-control regulations
would prevent some borrowers from purchas-
ing their first homes, thereby impeding their
ability to build up equity capital. This may be,
but other incentives could always be offered
to help low- and middle-income families save
money for future homeownership, such as a
tax deduction for rental payments to match the
current mortgage interest rate deduction for
homeowners.
The Mother of All Deregulation
The Clinton administration's free-market pro-
gram culminated in two momentous
deregulatory acts. Near the end of his eight
years in office, Clinton signed into law the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Mod-
ernization Act of 1999, one of the most far-
reaching banking reforms since the Great
Depression. It swept aside parts of the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 that had provided signifi-
cant regulatory firewalls between commercial
banks, insurance companies, securities firms,
and investment banks.
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I T MAY BE helpful to consider what has be-come of the old Federal Reserve RegulationsW and X, the old margin requirements on
consumer and housing loans. Since the gutting
of Glass-Steagall, the new Regulation W deals
with transactions between commercial banks
and their securities affiliates. Federal regulato-
ry resources, which in the past were directed to
the safety and soundness of mortgage and con-
sumer loans, are now redirected to the opaque
transactions between affiliates within financial
conglomerates. The former regulatory effort was
prudential and preventive in nature, the latter
more akin to monitoring the problem only after
the horse had left the barn.
Wall Street had been lobbying for years
for an end to Glass-Steagall, but it had not
received much support before Clinton.
Among those with a personal interest in the
demise of Glass-Steagall was Robert Rubin,
who had months earlier stepped down as
treasury secretary to become chair of
Citigroup, a financial-services conglomerate
that was facing the possibility of having to
sell off its insurance underwriting subsidiary.
Although Rubin openly boasted of his lob-
bying efforts to abolish Glass-Steagall, the
Clinton administration never brought
charges against him for his obvious violations
of the Ethics in Government Act.
Rubin also appealed to liberal sentiment. He
claimed to have urged Congress and the White
House to preserve the Community Reinvest-
ment Act (CRA), which sought to prod banks
to channel a portion of their lending to poor,
inner city areas. But there was already wide-
spread evidence that CRA was falling short by
permitting banks to engage in meaningless re-
porting requirements in place of substantive in-
vestment in low- and moderate-income
communities. The real action was not CRA re-
newal but the demise of the Glass-Steagall
firewalls. Banks were suddenly free to load up
on riskier investments as long as they did so
through affiliated entities such as their own
hedge funds and special investment vehicles.
Those riskier investments included exotic finan-
cial innovations, such as the complex derivatives
that were increasingly difficult for even experts
to understand or value.
In 1998, the sudden meltdown and bail-
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out of the Long-Term Capital Management
hedge fund showed the dangers of large de-
rivative bets staked on borrowed money. But
by March 1999, Greenspan was once again
praising derivatives as hedging instruments and
as enhancing the ability "to differentiate risk
and allocate it to those investors most able and
willing to take it."
In 1993, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) had considered extending
capital requirements to derivatives, but such
proposals went nowhere, and Wall Street lob-
bied to prevent any regulation of derivatives.
Then in December 2000, in his final weeks in
office, Bill Clinton signed into law the Com-
modity Futures Modernization Act, which
shielded the markets for derivatives from fed-
eral regulation.
Since then, derivatives have grown in size
and become gigantic wagers on the movement
of interest rates, commodity prices, and cur-
rency values. First came the CDO bubble,
which acted as a transmission belt by which
the subprime mortgage cancer metastasized
and spread through financial institutions
around the globe. Warren Buffett, legendary
investor and chair of Berkshire Hathaway,
would soon refer to such derivatives as "weap-
ons of mass destruction."
Since the collapse of the CDO market, the
next derivatives bubble may be the market for
credit default swaps, which are credit insurance
contracts designed to cover losses to banks and
bondholders when companies fail to pay their
debts. Today the notional amount of the credit
default swap market is at least $45 trillion, about
half the total U.S. household wealth and about
five times the national debt.
When Bear Stearns melted down this past
spring, it was holding $2.5 trillion in credit de-
fault swaps that were worth perhaps $40.3 bil-
lion in fair market value. The run on Bear
Stearns was largely caused by the collapsing
mortgage and CDO markets. But it was the
market for credit default swaps that may have
led the Federal Reserve to intervene. If Bear
Stearns had been allowed to fail, countless
counterparties on these credit default swaps
would have faced enormous losses. The shock
waves could have taken down major insurance
companies.
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This is why George Soros, billionaire
hedge-fund manager, has voiced his fears about
the unregulated market for credit default
swaps. According to Soros, the prospect of cas-
cading defaults hangs over the financial sys-
tem like a sword of Damocles. He has not
called for outlawing the market but for its regu-
lation by establishing a clearinghouse or ex-
change for the market, capital requirements,
and strict margin requirements for all existing
and future credit default swap contracts.
Chickens Come Home to Roost
History should deal harshly with Bill Clinton.
Throughout his terms, real wages stagnated,
manufacturing and service jobs moved overseas
in large numbers, and the middle class was
squeezed. With the federal government asleep
at the wheel, there was a significant rise in
predatory lending practices by banks and mort-
gage companies. By Clinton's final years in of-
fice, all of these trends had contributed to an
ominous rise in delinquencies and foreclosures
on subprime mortgage loans. This was particu-
larly pronounced in urban America. In Chi-
cago, for instance, foreclosures on subprime
mortgages rose from 131 in 1993 to more than
5,000 in 1999.
By the time Bush took office in 2001, the
Federal Reserve was once again stepping on
the accelerator. The collapse of Enron, a wave
of corporate governance scandals, and then the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were a
drag on economic activity, and so the Fed low-
ered interest rates from 6 percent to 1 percent
between January 2001 and June 2003.
The lower interest rates helped revive the
stock market and housing bubbles. It was like
pouring gasoline on a fire. By July 2005, the
Economist was referring to the U.S. housing
market as "the largest financial bubble in his-
tory." Some officials began to sound the alarm.
The debt of American households was climb-
ing nearly 20 percent a year, the savings rate
had fallen below zero, and the cash being
pulled out of homes from mortgage refinanc-
ings had reached about 5 percent of GDP. This
fueled an enormous consumption binge and a
growing trade deficit that put downward pres-
sure on the dollar. Oil producing countries,
paid in dollars, began raising oil prices to make
up the difference.
It was clear the housing bubble had spread
into an even larger dollar bubble. Something
had to be done. But without margin require-
ments or any other selective credit controls, the
Federal Reserve could only raise short-term in-
terest rates to cool the housing market and en-
courage household savings. Starting in 2004,
the Fed began tapping on the brake, raising
short-term interest rates seventeen consecutive
times from 1 percent to 5.25 percent over a
two-year period.
If Greenspan was worried that the rise in
interest rates could lead to panic, he tried not
to show it. "The vast majority of homeowners,"
he said, "have a sizable equity cushion with
which to absorb a potential decline in house
prices."
Greenspan could not have been more wrong.
The steep rise in home foreclosures, now at an
all-time record high, has contributed to a down-
ward spiral of housing prices, which in turn has
contributed to more foreclosures. By last Au-
gust, there were more than 200,000 monthly
foreclosure filings nationwide. For all of 2007,
1.2 million properties—more than 1 percent of
all U.S. households—were in some stage of fore-
closure, up 75 percent in only a year. By April
2008, about 2 percent were in foreclosure, and
nearly 9 percent, some 4.8 million home loans,
were past due or in foreclosure.
Losses from the subprime meltdown have
surely passed half a trillion dollars, and some
estimates now exceed a trillion dollars. Major
U.S. financial institutions have turned for help
to central banks and sovereign wealth funds
from abroad. The housing market is in its worst
decline in memory, the dollar is falling to record
lows, and the U.S. economy may be heading
into recession.
Many observers have linked the costs of the
war in Iraq to economic problems at home, and
certainly the billions of dollars being spent in
Iraq could be better invested in the nation's
declining infrastructure. But perhaps most
overlooked has been the adverse impact of the
war on the value of the dollar and the price of
oil. As America's standing has declined in the
world, in large part a result of this war, the dol-
lar and dollar-denominated investments have
also suffered. Past U.S. housing declines, such
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as during the savings and loan crisis of the late
1980s, were somewhat shielded from global
financial forces. With the rise of the euro and
the yen as viable alternative currencies, a de-
clining dollar now poses a far greater threat to
continued American prosperity than in the
past.
The war in Iraq, along with the erosion of
trust in U.S. financial institutions, will likely
continue to undermine the dollar's role as the
world's transactional currency, reserve currency,
store of value, and safe investment haven. As
the dollar continues to fall, higher inflation will
be imported into the United States, and the
Federal Reserve may find itself unable to re-
duce interest rates aggressively enough because
of fears of inflation and the need to defend the
dollar. It will likely seek new ways to push li-
quidity into the banking system, but as in Iraq
itself, this is unfamiliar and uncertain territory.
With the slowdown in the U.S. economy,
governments at all levels—federal, state, and
local—have been badly crippled by declining
tax revenues. A Democratic Congress and Re-
publican president responded with a $168 bil-
lion fiscal-stimulus program consisting of
rebates of about $600 per taxpayer to put
money back in the hands of consumers. Once
again, the Federal Reserve is stepping on the
accelerator, cutting interest rates aggressively
to try to reinflate the bubble economy. Only
now the Fed's room for maneuver is cramped
by the weak dollar and renewed inflation.
Lessons From the Panic
Thomas Paine once suggested that panics have
their uses. Their peculiar advantage, he wrote,
is that they are "the touchstone of sincerity and
hypocrisy, and bring things and men to light
which might otherwise have lain forever un-
discovered."
The present panic in our markets should
bring to light a number of hypocrisies. Perhaps
the first is that there was some significant dif-
ference between the economic policies of
Clinton and Bush. It is true that the Bush tax
cuts contributed to a rising federal deficit, but
the Clinton years were also marked by large
public deficits. It was only at the end that
Clinton saw any surplus and that was after
racking up more than a trillion dollars in fed-
48 n DISSENT / Summer 2008
eral debt. Moreover, the Clinton surplus was
a function of several troubling trends, includ-
ing the administration's never-ending policy of
fiscal austerity. In fact, federal spending fell
to about 18 percent of GDP, the lowest level
for the end of any presidency since those of
Dwight Eisenhower and, before that, of
Herbert Hoover.
Another factor that contributed to the final
Clinton surplus was the inflated U.S. dollar and
huge capital inflows that were attracted to dol-
lar-denominated investments, all of which
pumped up economic growth and tax revenues.
It was therefore Clinton's commitment to the
Washington Consensus platform of free trade
and unrestricted capital mobility that made
those hot money inflows possible while also set-
ting the stage for the reversal of portfolio capi-
tal flows and today's declining dollar.
During Clinton's first three years in office,
the federal government borrowed more than $1
trillion, much from abroad. Then between
1996 and 1998, foreign ownership of U.S. gov-
ernment securities rose 26 percent, from $669
billion to $847 billion. Under Bush, foreign
ownership of U.S. government securities rose
another 88 percent to $1.6 trillion by 2005.
During the Clinton years, mortgage debt
grew by nearly two-thirds, from $4.1 trillion to
$6.8 trillion. Under Bush, mortgage debt then
doubled to $13 trillion in 2006. Likewise, un-
der Clinton, consumer debt doubled from
$856 billion to $1.7 trillion. Under Bush, it
grew by another one-third to $2.3 trillion in
2006.
Much of this debt was borrowed from for-
eigners flush with dollars, a result of our huge
trade deficits. This was the underside of the
Clinton bubble economy, and it set the course
for the Bush years. U.S. trade deficits also
translated into increased foreign ownership of
corporate America. Foreign ownership of U.S.
corporate stocks and bonds rose nearly 50 per-
cent in Clinton's final three years, from $1.9
trillion to $2.8 trillion, and then another 53 per-
cent under Bush to $4.3 trillion.
A comparison of all foreign-owned assets
in the United States, including U.S. govern-
ment and corporate securities, foreign direct
investment, and private debt, shows remark-
able similarities between the administrations.
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In Clinton's final three years, foreign-owned
assets in the United States rose nearly 30 per-
cent from $5.9 trillion to $7.6 trillion. Under
Bush, foreign ownership of U.S. assets rose by
another two-thirds to $12.7 trillion by 2005.
T HE IDEA OF market discipline is anotherhypocrisy revealed by the present panic.The Washington Consensus preaches pri-
vate competition, transparent markets, and less
government regulation. Although many mortgage
borrowers have been subject to ruthless, unfet-
tered competition, investment banks and hedge
funds are increasingly protected by hidden sub-
sidies. Thanks to the combination of deregula-
tion and Federal Reserve bailouts, profits were
privatized while the losses are now socialized.
For instance, when the subprime mortgage
crisis started spilling into CDOs and credit
markets last July, the Federal Reserve began
purchasing billions of dollars of government
securities to stabilize the markets as well as
the solvency of its financial constituents. On
August 9, 2007, the Fed injected $19 billion
into the financial system. The next day it pur-
chased another $38 billion. This was coordi-
nated with the European Central Bank, which
injected more than $200 billion in euros dur-
ing the same two-day period. The Bank of
Japan also reportedly added liquidity to the
marketplace. Likewise, in the final week of
December alone, the European Central Bank
injected almost 350 billion euros (about $502
billion) into the market through purchases from
ailing financial institutions.
Such central bank subsidies are largely hid-
den from public view. When they become vis-
ible, you can be sure that the situation is
serious. Last December, the Fed announced a
new Term Auction Facility to allow commer-
cial banks to borrow from the Fed at subsidized
interest rates and against a wider range of as-
sets, such as their holdings of CDOs and other
"dodgy collateral." Within weeks it was re-
ported that banks had quietly borrowed about
$50 billion via this new credit facility. In mid-
March, as the crisis spread beyond commer-
cial banks to Wall Street investment houses,
the Fed dusted off powers it had not used since
the Great Depression, when it announced that
it would lend its primary dealers in the bond
market more than $200 billion in Treasury se-
curities for a month at a time and would ac-
cept ordinary mortgage-backed securities as
collateral. As the Financial Times reported, this
took the central bank "a step closer to the
nuclear option of actually buying mortgage-
backed securities in its own right."
In each of these central bank operations,
there has been no public debate among elected
officials, no checks, no balances. These market
interventions are often reported only after the
fact, if at all. Yet these subsidies dwarf in size
the fiscal-stimulus packages and other programs
of assistance for borrowers facing foreclosure.
A number of Wall Street institutions have
looked overseas for help. Under Robert Rubin's
leadership, Citigroup and its various affiliates
loaded up on CDOs and other mortgage-
backed securities. After billions of dollars in
losses, Citigroup was forced to raise more than
$40 billion in new capital to shore up its bal-
ance sheet, and it turned for help to the Per-
sian Gulf state of Abu Dhabi for an infusion
of $7.5 billion in new capital. Morgan Stanley,
UBS, the Blackstone Group—the list goes on
of investment banks that have turned to sov-
ereign wealth funds for bailout from foreign
governments, including some rather repressive,
antiliberal, and antidemocratic regimes.
Bear Stearns, the fifth-largest investment
banking firm in the United States, facing mount-
ing losses in the CDO market, at first found its
own "red knight" in Citic Securities, a Chinese
state-owned investment firm. But the meltdown
continued, and JP Morgan Chase, the third-larg-
est banking institution in the United States, was
likely exposed to Bear Stearns through huge
holdings of credit default swaps. The Fed
stepped in to close down Bear Stearns and ar-
range a shotgun wedding. JP Morgan purchased
Bear Stearns for pennies on the dollar, with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York agreeing to
fund up to $30 billion of the less-than-liquid
assets acquired by JP Morgan.
Because the Fed's bailout strategy is tar-
geted to the top of the financial pyramid, it has
done nothing to stem the decline in the mort-
gage market. Senator John McCain has voiced
the conservative view that homeowners should
not be bailed out and that the housing market
should be free to find its natural bottom.
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Others have seen the mortgage market as
quicksand, pulling down leading financial in-
stitutions no matter how hard the Fed bails out
their investments in C DOs. They also point
out the dangers of letting the housing market
fall, particularly in today's globalized environ-
ment, with a declining dollar and skittish for-
eign investors. The bottom of the market may
be much deeper and more painful than voters
will tolerate.
Leading Democrats in Congress, such as
Senator Chris Dodd and Representative Barney
Frank, have proposed funding for new or exist-
ing government agencies to purchase underly-
ing mortgages and refinance them at low, fixed
interest rates to keep people in their homes and
arrest the downward spiral in housing and credit
markets. Such plans have good historical pre-
cedent. The Home Owners' Loan Act and the
Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 provided mortgage
refinancing for tens of thousands of farmers and
homeowners facing foreclosure.
In April, the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)
called on investors at Citigroup's annual share-
holders meeting to support a plan to split
Citigroup's investment banking from its com-
mercial banking divisions. The breakup plan
questioned "the viability of the Citi business
model," an implicit indictment of Rubin him-
self for his role in dismantling the Glass-
Steagall regulatory firewalls.
Financial deregulation and central-bank au-
tonomy were supposed to make the U.S, finan-
cial sector stronger. Financial innovation was
among the great American exports, along with the
model of an independent central bank. The Fed-
eral Reserve, insulated from public politics, was
supposed to be the guarantor of price stability.
Instead, the Fed has presided over what has been
one of history's greatest financial bubbles.
Moreover, while trillions of dollars were
channeled into housing and stock market
bubbles, the public sector remained woefully
underfunded. This, too, has been the legacy
of the Clinton-Bush bubble economy: fiscal
austerity and budget cutbacks in physical and
social infrastructure, from structurally defi-
cient roads and bridges and inadequate wa-
ter and sewage systems to the collapsing
levees around New Orleans and declining
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public education everywhere.
Unfortunately, the myth of the Clinton
economy has too often served to limit discus-
sion about the political forces behind the
present crisis in the Washington Consensus. For
instance, Hillary Clinton, in promising a high-
level emergency panel to recommend ways to
overhaul at-risk mortgages, proposed in March
that such a council of wise men should include
two of the people most responsible for under-
mining the integrity of financial markets, former
treasury secretary Robert Rubin and former Fed-
eral Reserve chair Alan Greenspan.
The present crisis in the Washington Con-
sensus should present an opening to think
anew about the role of government and the
meaning of democracy in a mature capitalist
economy. There is an obvious need for pruden-
tial regulation—selective credit controls, mar-
gin requirements, minimum down payments,
and other sensible lending standards. One
could analogize to traffic regulation, but we
could also look to history.
The Greatest Generation was able to invest
on a scale much greater than today, spending
billions of dollars on the Second World War, the
Marshall Plan that rebuilt Western Europe and
Japan, and the G.I. Bill of Rights that housed,
educated, and integrated more than sixteen mil-
lion returning war veterans. As a percentage of
GDP, the U.S. government spent more than
twice as much and borrowed more than fifteen
times as much as today. But it borrowed at near-
zero interest from domestic instead of foreign
sources. What made this possible was a Fed-
eral Reserve that was strictly accountable to the
elected branches, that imposed selective credit
controls to prevent inflation in asset markets,
and that steered funds away from private specu-
lative activities and into long-term public invest-
ment in physical and social infrastructure. This
period in public finance, spanning the war years
and the early cold war period, presents an al-
ternative paradigm to the bubble economy of
the Washington Consensus. •
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